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The Future of Law as a Profession 
Nancy J. Moore* 
For far too many years, lawyers and commentators have 
debated whether law is a profession or merely a business.1 The 
so-called business-profession dichotomy2 is somewhat of a 
misnomer.3 For many, maybe most lawyers, law is clearly a 
business in the sense that these lawyers seek to maximize their 
individual wealth as much (or as little) as other business 
persons.4 More importantly perhaps, lawyers in private practice 
 
 * Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
 1 See generally Nancy J. Moore, Review Essay: Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 
AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 773, 774 (1987).  
 2 See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of 
the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century 
Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2005). A draft of my paper was presented 
at a panel organized by Professor Levine for the International Legal Ethics Conference 
VII, held on July 14–16, 2016 in New York City. The panel was entitled “International 
Perspectives on the Business/Profession Dichotomy,” drawing on Professor Levine’s 
seminal article on the topic. See Fordham Univ. Sch. Law, International Perspectives on 
the Business/Profession Dichotomy (Program), FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. LAW, 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/25018/globalization_and_the_legal_profession/8033/interna
tional_perspectives_on_the_businessprofession_dichotomy_program 
[http://perma.cc/PK43-LHLG].  
 3 See, e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law 
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 465, 465 (2008) (“[L]aw has almost 
always been an occupation that displays characteristics of both business and profession, 
with changes in emphasis over time.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Adam Winer, Destabilizing the Business-Profession 
Dichotomy: Louis Brandeis on Professionalism and Identity at 1 (Preliminary Draft, 
Mar. 27, 2017) (“[E]mpirical studies indicate that many lawyers tend to think of 
themselves as maximizing profits and as hired guns with little responsibility to the public 
good in their representation of clients.”) (on file with author). According to Pearce and 
Winer, Justice Brandeis viewed law as an occupation that “was part of the market,” but 
one that was not exclusively defined by the market. Id. at 14. Indeed, according to 
Brandeis, “[a] condition of professional success was applying efficiency and excellence to 
the work to the tasks of lawyers, seeking profit, and earning a high income”; however, he 
also believed that “a profession was an occupation ‘pursued largely for others and not 
merely for one’s self . . . in which the amount of financial return is not the [only] accepted 
measure of success.’” Id. at 14–15. Brandeis also believed that “business, too, could be a 
profession” in that it is “rich in opportunity for the exercise of man’s finest and most 
varied mental faculties and moral qualities.” Id. at 18. 
  Some commentators are more critical of lawyers who are motivated more by 
making money than by doing good. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in 
Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice 
Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 706–07 (1998) (describing how “[f]or lawyers, money is 
increasingly the be-all and end-all” and how “the lives of senior lawyers—particularly 
those in the elite firms—have become dominated by the pursuit of billable hours”); Kristin 
L. Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a 
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widely acknowledge that adopting improved business practices is 
critical to providing competent legal services.5 The question 
remains however, whether, unlike some other commercial 
occupations, law is also a profession and if so, what is the future 
for the professional aspects of legal practice in the United States 
and elsewhere? 
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Commission on 
Professionalism concluded that an occupation constitutes a profession 
when: (1) the “practice requires substantial intellectual training and 
the use of complex judgments”; (2) “clients cannot adequately 
evaluate the quality of the service, [and therefore] they must 
trust those they consult”; (3) “the client’s trust presupposes that 
the practitioner’s self-interest is overbalanced by devotion to 
serving both the client’s interest and the public good”; and (4) “the 
occupation is self-regulating—that is, organized in such a way as 
to assure the public and the courts that its members are 
competent, do not violate their client’s trust, and transcend their 
own self-interest.”6 Although other attributes are sometimes 
noted,7 the overriding theme appears to be dedication to serve 
the public good.8 
Some believe that to constitute a true profession, members of 
the occupation must personally serve the public interest by 
consistently placing the needs of the community above their own 
selfish interests9—in other words, that lawyers and other 
professionals must be more altruistic than other business 
 
Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 595–97 (2009) (describing how financial success has become 
many lawyers’ only goal). 
 5 See, e.g., Judith A. McMorrow, In Defense of the Business of Law, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 459, 461 (2012); Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application of Business 
Methods to the Practice of Law, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 13, 14 (1998). 
 6 A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, “ . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” 
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 1, 10 (1986), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/professionalism/Stanley_Com
mission_Report.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/76VW-XLJL]. 
 7 For example, some cite “admission to practice by a qualifying licensure,” as well as 
“a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those that 
prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace,” as well as “a system of discipline of its 
members for violation of the code of ethics.” Freeman v. Freeman, 311 N.E. 2d 480, 483 
(N.Y. 1974). 
 8 See, e.g., A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 6, at 10 (“The term 
refers to a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public 
service – no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. 
Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Implications of Globalization for the Professional Status 
of Lawyers in the United States and Elsewhere, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 220 (2012) 
[hereinafter Implications of Globalization] (citing works by Julius Cohen and 
Tom Morgan).  
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persons. If so, then there is considerable skepticism that this has 
ever been the case.10 
In my own writing on professionalism, however, I have 
focused on the criterion of self-regulation—the fact that 
professions are permitted to be, if not totally self-governing, at 
least more self-governing than other occupations.11 True, it is 
courts and not bar associations that oversee the regulation of 
legal practice in the United States, including admission to 
practice and lawyer discipline;12 however, given both the 
influence of lawyers on judges, who are themselves lawyers, and 
the status of judicially adopted codes of conduct as law, lawyers 
are in fact more self-governing than other U.S. professionals.13 
Professions are permitted to be more self-governing than 
other occupations because they have persuaded society that it is 
in the public interest to allow them to do so.14 But society can 
change its mind, as it did in the United Kingdom, when in 2007 
Parliament passed the Legal Services Act and dramatically 
changed the way in which the legal professions are regulated in 
England and Wales.15 Among other reforms, the Legal Services 
Act created an independent agency to oversee the lawyer 
disciplinary process and to assume primary responsibility for 
consumer complaints; moreover, this agency is required to have a 
chairperson and a majority of its members who are nonlawyers.16 
 
 10 See id. at 221 (citing work of Tom Morgan); see also Nancy J. Moore, 
Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AMER. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 773, 779 (1987) (“The 
notion that professions are more likely than other trades to put public interest above self-
interest is often met with considerable derision.”).  
 11 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9, at 222 (“[S]o long as the public permits the 
occupation to be self-regulating, the occupation would appear, as a matter of descriptive 
reality, to constitute ‘a profession’”); John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal 
Profession: Large Law Firms and Professional Re-regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507, 509 
(2011) (“Self-regulation is traditionally a key component of occupational control and a core 
objective for professional projects.”).  
 12 Outside the United States, lawyers may be subject to more direct regulation by 
state legislatures; however, local bar associations have control over the investigation and 
prosecution of lawyer misconduct. See CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW 
INITIATIVE, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, CEELI CONCEPT 
PAPER SERIES 7–11 (Maya Goldstein Bolocan ed., 2002). 
 13 See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 
14–15 (1989).  
 14 See Moore, supra note 10, at 784; see also, e.g., Flood, supra note 11, at 509–10 
(“Overall professional self-regulation has been seen as part of a broader regulative 
bargain where the state has granted professions a high degree of autonomy in organizing 
their own affairs in exchange for the professions’ pledge to guarantee quality and put 
public interest before their own.”).  
 15 See Moore, supra note 9, at 224–25.  
 16 Id. For a detailed description of the regulatory reforms in both the United 
Kingdom and in Australia, see generally Judith L. Maute, Global Continental Shifts to a 
New Governance Paradigm in Lawyer Regulation and Consumer Protection: Riding the 
Wave, in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE 
PROFESSION 11 (Francesca Bartlett et al. eds., 2011); see also Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on 
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The legislation also overrode prior professional rules by 
permitting lawyers to collaborate with nonlawyers in the 
provision of legal or multidisciplinary services.17 
So what is the future of the legal profession in the 
United States? 
Of course, it will be more difficult for society to enact 
dramatic reforms in the United States than it was in the United 
Kingdom. This is because U.S. lawyers are primarily regulated 
by fifty state courts as opposed to state legislatures or the federal 
government.18 Congress almost certainly has the authority to 
regulate lawyers, but so far has not shown the will to do so, 
except in an occasional, piecemeal fashion.19 
Putting these practical questions aside, what other 
considerations are likely to affect the future of legal professionalism 
in the United States? 
According to some critics, such as Tom Morgan, lawyer 
self-regulation has not benefitted the public.20 As a result, these 
critics believe that right-thinking citizens, including lawyers, 
should favor a form of deregulation. In other words, let lawyers 
be viewed as primarily commercial actors and be regulated in the 
same manner as other commercial actors.21 
I do not currently favor this position, as I am not yet 
convinced that lawyer self-regulation has produced more public 
detriments than benefits. I concede that the legal profession has 
often put the interests of lawyers ahead of the public,22 but I also 
 
the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in 
Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 14 (2009). 
 17 See Moore, supra note 9, at 224–25. 
 18 See Schneyer, supra note 16, at 13–17, 24–25. 
 19 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 
337 (1994). 
 20 See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66 (2010) (“Law 
in America is not a profession – and that’s a good thing.”). For a list of other publications 
by Morgan to the same effect, see Moore, supra note 9, at 217 n.2. See also id. at 228–29 
(describing Morgan’s view that “the concept of law as a profession and lawyers as 
professionals is good neither for lawyers . . . nor for the public at large”) (footnotes 
omitted). Of course, Morgan is not alone. See, e.g., CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. 
CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE 
LAWYERS 5 (2011); David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability 
Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 203, 207 (2004).  
 21 See Moore, supra note 9, at 228–29; see also, e.g., WINSTON ET AL., supra note 20; 
Barnhizer, supra note 20; cf. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An 
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 429, 433 (calling for complete deregulation of lawyers except for in-
court appearances). 
 22 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 10, at 786 (detailing some of the dangers of 
professional self-regulation).  
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believe that lawyers have enacted and enforced improvements in 
the rules of professional conduct and other forms of regulation, 
including the professionalization of the lawyer disciplinary system.23  
If I am right, then deregulation is not necessarily the 
preferred path for the future.24 And along these lines, I take 
heart from the fact that the United Kingdom has not removed 
lawyers from the regulatory process, but rather permits lawyer 
organizations to function as front-line regulators, albeit with a 
significant amount of external oversight.25 
Similarly, I have no problem with, and would likely support 
limited regulatory reform in the United States, including having 
Congress enact certain limited measures to solve various 
problems that state courts have been unable or unwilling to 
solve; for example, uniform minimalist standards for lawyer 
advertising and solicitation and perhaps even uniform standards 
for confidentiality and conflicts of interest.26 
But there are other, perhaps more pressing, problems facing 
the U.S. legal profession today. For example, will globalization 
force changes that are already occurring outside the United 
States, including nonlawyer ownership of law firms and 
multi-disciplinary practices?27 Advances in technology have 
 
 23 See Moore, supra note 9, at 229–32; see also Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can 
Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS (forthcoming 2017) (organized bar continues to act in altruistic and public-serving 
ways at the same time it acts in self-interested and protectionist ways). 
 24 See generally Moore, supra note 9, at 232–37 (suggesting several reasons why U.S. 
lawyers and lawyer organizations should consider “reprofessionalism, along the lines 
suggested by the current reforms in the U.K. and Australia”); see also, Julian Webb, The 
Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of English Legal Practice – and Some 
Lessons for New Zealand?, 16 WAIKATO L. REV. 21, 37 (2008) (noting that the debate 
preceding the adoption of the Legal Services Act of 2007 had moved “beyond a crude 
deregulation agenda” toward regulations designed to be “efficient, systematic, transparent 
and accountable”). 
 25 See Moore, supra note 9, at 224–27, 228, 233–35. For an argument that 
maintaining a significant level of professional self-regulation in the United Kingdom was 
the result of lobbying by English law firms based on their desire to remain competitive in 
Europe, where professionalism remains a core value among business clients, see 
Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means 
Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 469 (2008). 
 26 See, e.g., Janine Griffiths-Baker & Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest 
in Global Law Firms: Peace in Our Time?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2560 (2012) (“[I]t 
may be time for Congress to impose national standards in selective areas, such as conflict 
of interest rules for lawyers engaged in multistate or multinational practice.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice 
of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903, 2933 (2014) (discussing global 
pressures on the scope of the legal profession’s monopoly, including “governmental 
pressure, market developments, or both”); cf. James E. Moliterno, The Trouble With 
Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 885, 904 (2013) (“[T]he need to compete [with U.K law 
firms]” will drive U.S. law firms to lobby the ABA and Congress for the opportunity to 
compete more effectively in global markets.”); cf. Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking 
Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 38 
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already lead to a significant presence of online legal services such 
as LegalZoom in the United States.28 Many of these services are 
owned and operated by nonlawyers, presumably with the 
assistance of lawyers in creating the software programs.29 
Can lawyer self-regulation survive these changes? Or will 
lawyers and nonlawyers inevitably become so entangled30 that 
lawyer self-regulation will become meaningless? This is where 
U.S. lawyers will need to be the most creative in determining 
whether the profession can continue to regulate lawyers in a 
world of increasing integration of legal service providers. Is 
this possible? 
Assume, for example, that U.S. jurisdictions are eventually 
forced by competition to permit nonlawyer ownership of law firms 
and multi-disciplinary practices.31 Can lawyer self-regulation 
work in these types of practices? Both the United Kingdom and 
Australia seem to think so. In these countries, lawyers are still 
bound by regulations applicable to other lawyers, and there must 
be at least one lawyer in each of these “alternative business 
structures” who is responsible for ensuring that the professional 
rules are followed in the provision of legal services.32 
 
(2012) (discussing wide range of law and law-related services provided by nonlawyers or 
by lawyers in combination with nonlawyers, particularly in the corporate sector and the 
extent to which globalization has increased this trend).  
 28 See, e.g., Lauren Moxley, Note, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights 
Approach to Reforming the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 553 (2015). 
 29 LegalZoom was created by two lawyers who formerly practiced at Sullivan 
& Cromwell and Skadden Arps. Id. at 556. It makes sense to infer that lawyers play a 
significant role in product development, although LegalZoom’s website does not say so. 
Indeed, although the vice-president in charge of Legal Research and Product 
Development is a graduate of Yale Law School (see Vanessa Davis, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/vanessa-davis-0285a74 [http://perma.cc/NE9V-EEYE]), the 
LegalZoom website does not describe her as either a licensed lawyer or a law school 
graduate. About Us, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/ 
4R57-KM4Y]. LegalZoom probably chooses not to advertise the role that lawyers play in 
product development in order to avoid consumers relying on the company as providing 
legal services. Any such reliance would make it more difficult for LegalZoom to defend 
against unauthorized practice of law challenges. See generally Moxley, supra note 28. 
 30 See, e.g., Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer 
Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 14 (2016) (“As legal 
and non-legal work becomes more integrated, and entangled, within the firm employees 
may also be more likely to engage in the unauthorized practice of law or share 
confidential client information across different departments of the company.”); Benjamin 
H. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online Providers of Legal 
Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541 (2015) (describing various online legal service providers, 
possible common law responses to claims of injury, and the role of lawyers in developing 
software programs). 
 31 See supra note 27 & accompanying text.  
 32 See Moore, supra note 9, at 225–27. In the United Kingdom, all employees of a 
legal disciplinary practice (including practices owned by nonlawyers) are subject to the 
regulations applicable to lawyers, including all the nonlawyers. Id. at 225–26. An 
alternative business structure (which may provide multidisciplinary services) must have 
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Many U.S. lawyers have questioned the efficacy of this form 
of self-regulation in the context of nonlawyer ownership of both 
law firms and multidisciplinary practices. For example, even if 
the sole purpose of the firm is to provide legal services, critics 
have argued that nonlawyer ownership will place undue pressure 
on the lawyers to increase profits at the expense of client 
interests.33 This particular concern is almost certainly 
overstated, as many lawyers in lawyer-owned firms are “already 
predominantly driven by this desire.”34 Other concerns include 
conflicts of interest involving nonlawyer owners who have other 
commercial interests likely to conflict with client interests.35 
These concerns may be stronger in some forms of practice rather 
than others,36 but it is unclear why these types of conflicts cannot 
be addressed in the same way that law firms currently regulate 
conflicts involving the law firm’s financial interest in 
maintaining ties to its most lucrative clients.37 
For example, consider the possibility that Walmart 
will someday provide traditional legal services through 
lawyer-employees who work in offices located within a Walmart 
retail store.38 Conflicts may arise as a result of Walmart’s other 
commercial interests, including prospective clients who want to 
 
at least one manager authorized to practice law and must appoint a head of legal practice 
to ensure compliance with the ABS license and to report to the licensing authority any 
failure to comply with the terms of the license. Id. 
 33 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 30, at 46 (discussing concerns of others). 
 34 Robinson, supra note 30, at 46.  
 35 Id. at 46–47. 
 36 See, e.g., id. at 47 (discussing a large business process outsourcer with multiple 
contracts with the U.K. government, which was running both the migrant removal 
process and a government telephone hotline for indigents to access entitlement to legal 
aid: author expresses fear over conflicts arising from the concern that confidential 
information from immigrants who call the legal aid hotline might be shared with 
employees running the migrant removal process). 
 37 Further, it should be noted that personal injury defense lawyers have been 
permitted to practice in a law firm owned by the insurance company that funds the 
defense even though such a practice appears to violate the letter of ethics rules that 
prohibit lawyers from practicing in firms owned by a nonlawyer. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, 
The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special Solutions Required?, 
4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 260 (1997). 
 38 Even prior to its passage, the 2007 Legal Services Act was dubbed “Tesco law” 
because of the possibility that supermarkets like the English chain Tesco would be 
providing legal services. See, e.g., Katherine H. Reardon, Note, It’s Not Your Business! A 
Critique of the U.K. Legal Services Act of 2007 and Why Nonlawyers Should Not Own or 
Manage Law Firms in the United States, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 155, 156 (2012). 
Tesco does indeed provide legal services in the United Kingdom today. See Legal, TESCO, 
http://www.tesco-careers.com/Jobs-in-our-Office/Career-Path/Legal.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
96XY-H82M]. Previously, in the United States, lawyers commonly referred to the specter 
of legal services being offered by giant retailer Sears, Roebuck & Co. as a consequence of 
permitting nonlawyer ownership of law firms. See, e.g., Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers 
in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules? 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 578 (1989). 
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sue one of Walmart’s major suppliers. If the lawsuit is related to 
a matter involving Walmart, then the lawyer may have a 
material limitation conflict under Rule 1.7.39 If the lawsuit is 
unrelated to Walmart, then there would not be a directly adverse 
conflict under that rule (because the supplier is not a “client” of 
the Walmart law firm);40 however, if Walmart has a significant 
financial interest in not disturbing its relationship with the 
supplier, then there may be a so-called “punch pulling” conflict,41 
which is yet another form of a material limitation conflict.42 
Either way, the Walmart lawyers would be expected to identify 
the conflict and deal with it accordingly, by either refusing the 
proffered representation or obtaining the informed consent of 
the client.43  
Similarly, lawyers who provide legal services in the context 
of a multidisciplinary practice should be able to address conflicts 
of interest and other ethical issues, so long as the legal services 
are provided in much the same way as in a traditional law firm. 
Assume, for example, that a lawyer, an accountant, and a social 
worker form a partnership to provide the different services 
typically required in family law matters. The lawyer will be in 
charge of providing the legal services, and will not permit her 
nonlawyer partners to “direct or regulate the lawyer’s 
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”44 If there 
are conflicts of interest arising from the partners’ relationships 
with their own clients, these conflicts can be identified and 
addressed as in traditional law firms or law firms owned by 
nonlawyers, such as Walmart.45 To the extent that the nonlawyer 
partners assist the lawyer in the provision of legal services, they 
 
 39 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(concurrent conflict exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer”). 
 40 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (a conflict 
of interest exists if “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client”) (emphasis added). 
 41 See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 833, 884 n.196 (2005). 
 42 The concern is that the lawyer’s financial interest in pleasing the nonclient 
adverse party “might tempt the lawyer the [sic] ‘pull her punches’ on behalf of a client.” Id. 
 43 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). This is 
precisely what lawyers in England and Wales are currently required to do when 
practicing in an alternative business structure. See Alternative Business Structures, THE 
LAW SOCIETY, ¶4 http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/ 
alternative-business-structures/ (“You may not be able to accept instructions from some 
clients where aims of different parts of an ABS may conflict with a client’s best 
interests.”) [http://perma.cc/RMC8-BKTM]. 
 44 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (concerning 
persons who recommend, employ, or pay a lawyer to render legal services). 
 45 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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would be subject to the supervision of the lawyer, as in any other 
law firm.46 
The more difficult challenges will come when lawyers become 
more integrated with nonlawyers in the provision of services that 
are not clearly or primarily legal services. For example, consider 
Richard Susskind’s prediction that many future lawyers will 
become “legal knowledge engineer[s]” working alongside business 
and computer experts developing standardized working practices 
and computer systems.47 Are they providing legal services or are 
they providing interdisciplinary services that are not clearly or 
solely legal?48 Should these lawyers be regulated by lawyer codes 
or are they more like compliance officers, who may or may not 
have a law degree but who are nonetheless knowledgeable about 
the law?49 
Legally trained compliance officers are but one of several 
“quasi-legal” roles that lawyers have assumed in recent years.50 
As Tanina Rostain has explained, many lawyers are now serving 
as “law consultants,” working at corporate risk management 
firms and employment law consulting firms that offer 
“investigative, compliance, and other law-related services,” 
purportedly “outside the confines of the attorney-client 
relationship.”51 Thus far, the assumption has been that these 
 
 46 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants, including nonlawyers “associated with 
a lawyer”). 
 47 See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 272 (2010). This is the role 
that lawyers presumably play in companies that provide online legal documents or other 
forms of online legal or law-related services, such as Legal Zoom. See supra notes 28–29 
& accompanying text. 
 48 See supra note 29 (describing the likely role of lawyers in Legal Zoom’s software 
product development and Legal Zoom’s efforts to downplay that role in order to avoid 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law). For a discussion of various efforts to 
characterize Legal Zoom as engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, see, e.g., Moxley, 
supra note 28, at 558. 
 49 See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1397, 1410 (2006) (“Recognizing that compliance expertise is not primarily legal, 
regulations that require the designation of internal compliance personnel as part of a 
compliance program do not specify that the corporate officer or employee in question be a 
lawyer or have a law degree.”). For a more detailed discussion of the role of compliance 
officers, see generally Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the 
Borders of Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2961, 2964 (2014). 
 50 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1398. See generally Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The 
Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1246 (2014). Another example 
of a “quasi-legal” service is legal process outsourcing, which includes “not only the 
repetitive administrative functions associated with legal work and paralegal work, but 
also the complex work involved in legal research, due diligence, contract negotiations, 
etc.” Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen 
or Stone Soup? 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2795 n.21 (2012). 
 51 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1398. 
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“law consultants” are not practicing law.52 Indeed, to avoid any 
contrary appearance, consulting firms emphasize that they do not 
provide legal advice and avoid advertising their legally-trained 
personnel as licensed lawyers.53 
One potential benefit of explicitly permitting multidisciplinary 
practices and other forms of alternative business structures is that 
at least some of these “law consultants” may choose to 
acknowledge and embrace the fact that the services they are 
offering are in fact legal services. If so, then to the extent that 
they provide these legal services in much the same way as in a 
traditional law firm, they, too can be “self-regulated” in the 
manner described above.54 However, other “law consultants” may 
prefer to continue holding themselves out as performing nonlegal 
services. As Rostain and others have noted, there are benefits to 
the nonlawyer role, including the “fundamentally contractual 
nature of the relationship with clients,”55 which avoids the 
imposition of fiduciary duties to clients and special obligations to 
third persons.56 Thus, although some lawyers now beyond the 
pale of lawyer regulation may opt back into the self-regulatory 
lawyer system, even more lawyers may now opt out of 
that system. 
What is to be done? Recall that I am positing that these 
changes will occur,57 whether we want them to or not.58 Rostain 
 
 52 Id. at 1410–11; see also, e.g., Remus, supra note 50, at 1261–62. 
 53 See Rostain, supra note 49, at 1407 & n.51. 
 54 See supra notes 11–13 & accompanying text. 
 55 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1398. 
 56 Id. at 1420–25; see also Remus, supra note 50, at 1269–73 (referring to the ability 
of some corporations to employ “ethical arbitrage” by using law consultants to perform 
work that would otherwise be done by a lawyer). Rostain also notes the decreasing 
advantages often thought to accrue as a result of hiring a lawyer in an attorney-client 
relationship, i.e. the advantages of the attorney-client privilege and work-product 
doctrine, which she suggests are of less importance today due to pressures on companies 
to waive such privileges in the context of government investigations. See Rostain, supra 
note 49, at 1412–19. 
 57 Commentators have noted that at least the corporate side of the legal services 
market is already moving toward effective deregulation, including not only the emergence 
of consulting services, but also the rise of legal process outsourcing. See, e.g., Ray Worthy 
Campbell, Rethinking Reg. and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Mkt., 9 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 1, 47–49 (2016). 
 58 Whether or not to permit either nonlawyer ownership of law firms or 
multidisciplinary practices has been a continuing topic of debate. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N 
ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING ALT. BUS. STRUCTURES (2011) (including 
brief history of ABA’s consideration of nonlawyer ownership of law firms and other forms 
of alternative business structures). The ABA recently confirmed its firm resistance to any 
form of alternative business structures by rejecting a modest proposal to permit 
nonlawyer professionals to participate in the ownership of law firms. See ABA COMM’N ON 
ETHICS 20/20, ABA COMM’N WILL NOT PROPOSE CHANGES TO ABA POLICY PROHIBITING 
NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP OF LAW FIRMS (2012). For a recent discussion of the pros and 
cons of nonlawyer ownership of legal services, see Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t 
Get All the Profits: Non-lawyer Ownership, Access and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL 
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finds it “difficult to envision a successful regulatory strategy to 
address” the risk that law consultants will use “their expertise 
and authority in ways that may harm the interests of employees 
and other third parties.”59 Dana Remus proposes that, in order to 
avoid this form of “ethical arbitrage,”60 lawyers in “quasi-legal” 
roles who want to retain their professional licenses should be 
forced to accept the “obligations of professional regulation.”61 
This would entail expanded professional rules tailored explicitly 
to the new law consultant.62 
But not all law consultants, including legal knowledge 
engineers,63 are nefariously seeking to avoid professional 
regulation.64 And it seems highly unlikely that lawyers will 
succeed in extending their current authority to routinely regulate 
the lawyers who perform such “quasi-legal” roles.65 In situations 
where there is genuine confusion regarding whether an 
attorney-client relationship has been formed, then-existing law is 
probably sufficient to impose current regulatory requirements on 
these lawyers and their firms.66  
If and when the use of law consultants raises an 
unreasonable risk of corporate overreaching or other harm to 
third persons or the public, then we should trust judges and 
legislators to regulate these practices in the same way they 
choose to regulate (or not) other providers of commercial services. 
Although it is true that the political will is probably lacking to 
enact any comprehensive regulation of law consulting (or 
 
ETHICS 1, 53–54 (2016) (concluding, contrary to most academic commentators and other 
competition advocates, that it is unlikely that deregulatory approaches will make legal 
services more affordable and identifying challenges to professionalism). 
 59 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1425.  
 60 See Remus, supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 61 Remus, supra note 50, at 1276. 
 62 Id. at 1277–85. 
 63 See SUSSKIND, supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 64 See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 49, at 1409–10 (detailing how some compliance 
regimes “require the deployment of multidisciplinary expertise,” including the design of 
systems that “interweave[] legal, financial, and software expertise”). 
 65 See id. at 1425–26 (lawyers might seek to protect third parties by extending the 
meaning of legal practice to include legal consultants, but “[p]roposing an expanded 
definition of law practice would also meet significant resistance on a variety 
of . . . grounds, including its detrimental effects on the capacity of the public to obtain 
access to the legal system”). But see Remus, supra note 50, at 1284–85 (acknowledging 
significant obstacles to these types of reforms, but concluding that such reform is possible 
if state courts take the lead). 
 66 In determining whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed, “[c]ourts 
are alert to what a person claiming to be a client might reasonably have believed under 
the circumstances, especially if the person has given the lawyer confidential information 
to enable the lawyer to perform a legal service that would benefit that person . . . .” 
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 24 (9th ed. 2012). See generally Susan R. 
Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2005). 
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consulting generally),67 specific problems can be addressed on a 
piecemeal basis, which is how most businesses are currently 
regulated. Such a piecemeal approach may not be ideal, but 
neither is the current regulation of the legal profession, given the 
many disadvantages of lawyer self-governance.68 
When lawyers and nonlawyers are truly integrated in a 
practice, it is probably true that lawyers cannot be regulated in 
the same manner as lawyers providing more traditional legal 
services. But this state of affairs does not necessarily mean the 
end of either lawyers or lawyer self-regulation. Even in 
Susskind’s world of the future,69 many, perhaps even most 
lawyers will continue to provide legal services in more or less 
traditional attorney-client relationships, although the work may 
not always be of the customized, or bespoke, variety.70 And in 
this future world, it may well be that lawyer self-regulation, 
albeit in a somewhat different form, will continue to be both 
possible and even desirable. We shall see. 
 
 
 
 
 67 See Rostain, supra note 49, at 1426. 
 68 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 69 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 70 See SUSSKIND, supra note 47, at 271. 
